

30 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ONE

Subject: Interview with the Director of
Office of Intelligence Coordination
and Liaison, Department of State

1. Attached is a copy of a memorandum reporting the attitude of Mr. Evans of the State Department.
2. At such time as it may become appropriate and convenient to ONE, ICAPS will welcome any proposals which will improve relations between CIG and SAE.

DONALD BUKAR
Chief, ICAPS

Attachment -

Memo dtd 15 May '47
to Chief, ICAPS, fr
 re above
subject

DB/all

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Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003500090033-3

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CHIEF, ICAPS

DATE: 15 MAY 1947

FROM :

SUBJECT: Interview with Mr. Allan Evans, Director of Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, Department of State

1. Pursuant to your memo of 2 May, 1947 and to the memo from the Deputy Director, subject, "Implementation of ICAPS Survey", dated 29 April, 1947, I called upon Mr. Allan Evans on 14 May, 1947 for the purpose of obtaining his views on expediting clearances by the Department of State of ORE intelligence estimates.

2. Mr. Evans expressed general dissatisfaction over the coordination procedures existing between his office and CIG, particularly with respect to ORE production of intelligence estimates. He pointed out that the greater bulk of the source material used by ORE was received from State, and that the finished estimates were usually basically of a political-economic nature in which State had the predominant interest. For this reason, he considered that most of the estimates produced recently by ORE were the responsibility of State, and did not constitute national intelligence in the sense of transcending the competence of any one department. He added that in his opinion national intelligence studies prepared by ORE should be a synthesis of State, War and Navy finished departmental studies. Mr. Evans stated that he very frequently had no knowledge of material being produced in ORE until he found a copy of the finished product on his desk, and that there appeared to be little or no effort by ORE to seek the views of State prior to publishing a paper on a foreign political economic situation, although there were frequent requests for additional source material on a variety of subjects. He called particular attention to two ORE papers in which lack of coordinated effort in the preparatory stage had seriously embarrassed the Department. The first of these was on Austria, the circumstances of which have been previously given, and, more recently, a paper prepared by the Latin-American Branch of ORE which conflicted with State's views. He said that his office did not like to express substantial dissent because it gives the impression to the high level recipients of ORE estimates that there exists confusion in the government intelligence agencies, and causes discredit to the CIG and member agencies.

3. As a proposal for the correction of this lack of coordinated effort, Mr. Evans recommended the establishment of a permanent State-CIG committee composed of the research and production chiefs of CIG and the member agencies with ICAPS participation for overall coordination. This committee, he believed, should work out production schedules and a location of responsibilities for production.

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4. After this interview I obtained the ORE views with respect to Mr. Evans's remarks. It was evident that there did not exist the great lack of coordination between ORE and State on working levels in the early stages of preparation of ORE papers which Mr. Evans complained of. It was freely admitted that the effectiveness of this liaison between the geographic branches of the two activities depended upon the personalities involved; in some cases it was excellent and in others unsatisfactory. The Chief, Projects Division's liaison with Mr. Hallaby, his opposite member in SA-E, is believed to be excellent and, insofar as possible, he always communicates to Mr. Hallaby ORE's production schedules. The only papers on which it is impossible to give advance information are those originally intended for the Weekly Summary found at a late date to be worth a separate special evaluation. The impracticability of producing papers in ORE which are a true synthesis of finished departmental studies was pointed out, and opinion expressed that the special studies produced did constitute national intelligence, although admittedly primarily of a political-economic nature. This opinion was based on the fact that the studies, although containing little of a military aspect due to its relative unimportance in these cases, were of national interest to all recipients.

5. Although it was agreed that every effort should be made to maintain and possibly improve early interchange of views with member agencies on ORE papers, it was emphatically denied that ORE papers should reflect the agency views if substantial dissent exists. It was pointed out that in the cases in which State had objected to the opinions expressed in ORE papers, it was without exception due to the fact that intelligence information received led to intelligence estimates which ran counter to foreign policies established by the State Department, and that for this reason the unbiased evaluated estimates from ORE were of particular value. Mr. Evans's committee proposal was not concurred in because it was believed that it would tend to curtail the initiative of ORE in preparation of studies.

6. My resulting opinions are:

a. Mr. Evans is not kept fully informed by his subordinates with respect to existing coordination in liaison contacts on the working levels.

b. There is a need for better direction and supervision over present coordination procedures on the planning and office chief levels.

c. Mr. Evans's opinion that ORE estimates should be a synthesis of finished departmental intelligence is not only impracticable, but would put the accomplishment of our mission in jeopardy.

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
6. d. The establishment of an interdepartmental committee, as proposed by Mr. Evans, might lead to the restriction of ORE's freedom in expressing its own evaluated estimates devoid of departmental bias.

7. It is recommended that the Assistant Director, ORE, with the collaboration of ICAPS if needed, establish close relationship with the Director, Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, with the three fold purpose of:

a. Reaching an agreement with Mr. Evans on ORE production procedures based on the accomplishment of the CIG mission as they effect the Department of State.

b. Assuring the most intimate practicable liaison relationships on working levels during preparatory stages of ORE papers in order to provide for a free exchange of opinions.

c. Working out a satisfactory solution to the problem of expediting the clearance of ORE papers in the State Department compatible with providing sufficient time for their consideration in the department.



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March 5, 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: OIR - Research Divisions

SUBJECT: Departmental Clearance of CIG Papers.

The following policy principles and implementing procedures are established for effecting State Department clearance of CIG intelligence estimates and papers:

1. Departmental clearance does not imply responsibility for the writing, presentation, and detail of a CIG paper, but only agreement with the general argument and substantial conclusions of the paper. The position can most easily be summarized by saying that clearance implies not perfection, but the absence of harmful misinformation and misinterpretation.

2. It follows that only points of substantial disagreement need be considered in negotiating a clearance, though if time permits, any suggestions for improvement of fact or verbiage are naturally to be encouraged - but time should be the controlling consideration.

3. Disagreement may affect a word, a sentence, a paragraph, or larger elements of a paper. CIG has the right to publish any paper, but the Department has the right to express its disagreement in terms of any element it may please to criticize.

4. The most efficient and rapid way to reach an irreducible minimum of disagreement between the Department and CIG is to arrange, whenever necessary, a conference between responsible analysts who will clear away adjustable issues and agree upon formulation of any dissenting opinion which remains, for notation in the final paper.

5. Responsibility for observation of the Department's interests in CIG papers as finally published rests with the Special Assistant through his representative to CIG [] who must receive notice of action on draft papers so that he may fulfill his responsibility.



Office of Intelligence Research

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PROCEDURES FOR EFFECTING CLEARANCE OF CIG PAPERS

1. Each draft CIG paper will be forwarded by [] to OIR Intelligence Coordination Staff for the Director, OIR. 25X1
2. ICS will with minimum delay forward the draft paper to the appropriate element of the organization and assist in conveying it as rapidly as possible with any relevant information to the agreed responsible analyst.
3. The analyst will prepare a report upon the draft, securing all necessary clearances within his Division and in the Department. The report will take one of the three forms listed below and require action as described.
4. Concurrence. If the analyst finds the draft satisfactory as it stands, he will
 - a. Notify ICS by phone, for immediate relay to []
 - b. Follow up with a brief note of confirmation. 25X1
5. Suggestions. If the analyst in his report recommends only inessential changes of substance or form, he will
 - a. Notify ICS by phone, for immediate relay to []
 - b. Send a memorandum of recommended changes to ICS for [] or 25X1
 - c. Arrange a conference as in 6. below and after the conference send to ICS a brief notification that the draft has been cleared.
6. Substantial Disagreement. If the draft occasions substantial disagreement in the Department, to the extent that the draft is regarded as harmful, the analyst will
 - a. Clearly distinguish in his report between inessential and indispensable recommendations.
 - b. Inform ICS of intended action, which shall be either to send to ICS the action copy of the analyst's recommendations for [] or to proceed as follows:

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- (1) Arrange for a conference to comprise pleni-
potentiary representatives of CIG and State,
including such analysts and other Departmental
officers as may be desirable. (The contact in
CIG, if the responsible analyst there is not
known, is
 - (2) Endeavor at the conference to work out a mutually
satisfactory draft.
 - (3) If irreconcilable disagreement remains, formulate
as soon as possible after the conference, clear-
with the Division Chief and the Director, OIR, and
forward to CIG, a note or notes to be appended to
CIG's final paper expressing the Department's
reservations.
 - (4) Forward to ICS for a statement of the
outcome of the conference, preferably in the form
of a copy of the analyst's original recommendations,
with clear indication of essential changes and
explicit reservations which should appear in the
published version.
7. A copy of the final, published CIG paper will be sent as quickly as
possible from and ICS to the responsible analyst for
control purposes.

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